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Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the 
Nonmedical Professions 
Carl S. Hawkins* 
Tort liability for professional malpractice is not some recent 
invention of greedy claimants or unscrupulous lawyers. Long 
before the emergence of modern contract and negligence theo- 
ries in the Anglo-American legal system, persons in "common 
callings" were liable for injuries inflicted upon others in the 
course of their work? The term "common calling" was appar- 
ently applied to any service occupation regularly pursued, as dis- 
tinguished from occasional undertakings. It included most of to- 
day's professions but did not set professions apart from other 
occupations and apparently did not distinguish certain callings 
as particularly vested with a public interest.' Liability of those 
engaged in these occupations may have been stricter than under 
modern negligence principles because the defendant might be li- 
able for injury inadvertently caused in the course of his occupa- 
tion, unless it could be excused by proof of rather extraordinary 
 circumstance^.^ Contemporary tort law generally requires the 
victim of inadvertent injury to prove specific substandard con- 
duct on the defendant's part as the basis of liability. 
When contemporary negligence theory developed in the 
* Dean and Guy Anderson Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University; Professor, University of Michigan Law School, 1957-1973. B.A., Brig- 
ham Young University, 1948; J.D., Northwestern University, 1951. 
This Article is based on a paper prepared by the author for the Symposium on Pro- 
fessional Liability, held in Denver, Colorado, July, 1977, by the Academy for Contempo- 
rary Problems, the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, 
and the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
1. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 184 (1881); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
THE COMMON LAW 480-82 (5th ed. 1956); T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL UBIL- 
ITY 250-51, 273 (1906); Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. 
PA. L. REV. 411 (1927); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. 
REV. 184, 185-86 (1926). 
2. See Arterburn, supra note 1, at 418-28. 
3. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 184-203; T. RUCKNETT, supra note 1, at 480-82; 
Winfield, supra note 1, at 186. 
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19th century, its dominant purpose was to protect enterprise 
against the stricter liability of the early common law.4 Claims 
based upon professional malpractice were easily absorbed.' Per- 
sons inadvertently injured by those they engaged to perform ser- 
vices might have damage claims for breach of contract, but only 
if expressed or implied terms of the contract were violated; or 
they might have claims for tort, but only if negligence could be 
proved.' Negligence actions against professional persons devel- 
oped special requirements for proof of negligence by reference to 
professional standards. Thus, negligence theory shielded profes- 
sional persons from liability, unless their alleged victims could 
prove that the defendant's conduct had fallen beneath the stan- 
dards of the defendant's own profession and had proximately 
caused the plaintiffs injuries without any contributory fault on 
the plaintiffs part. These protective developments in legal the- 
ory,' coupled with the development of liability insurance in the 
20th century: made it possible for professionals to undertake 
increasingly large and complex tasks, consistent with the needs 
of our industrial society, without fear of financial ruin resulting 
from tort liability to persons damaged. 
Now, however, the pendulum may be swinging back against 
the professions. Tort claims for professional malpractice have 
accelerated: and professional liability insurance premiums have 
4. See L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK,,J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS & A. SMITH, CASES ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 552-54 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as L. GREEN]; T. PLUCKNETT, 
supra note 1, at 461,471; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 139-40 (4th ed. 
1971); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); 
Henderson, "Crisis" in Accident Loss Reparation Systems: Where We Are and How We 
Got There, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401, 404-10; Winfield, supra note 1, at 185. 
5. See Wade, Foreword to T. R o w  & W. ANDERSON, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE at 
v (1960). 
6. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 613-22. 
7. See L. GREEN, note 4 supra; Henderson, note 4 supra. 
8. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 542; Henderson, supra note 4, at 410-13. 
9. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S 
COMMISSION O  MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6-7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (medical 
malpractice claims in 1970 increased by 10.6% over previous year in U.S., by 26% in 
California); Bergadano, Recent Developments and Perspectives in Accountants' Profes- 
sional Liability, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 231,231-32, 241 (1975) (accountants); Epstein, Medi- 
cal Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 A.B.F. RES. J. 87; Jericho & Coultas, Are 
Lawyers an Insurable Risk?, 63 A.B.A.J. 833 (1977); Martin, Lawyers' Professional Lia- 
bility-A Developing Crisis?, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 532 (1976); Regalia & Johnson, "There 
But For the Grace of God, Go I," 14 CAL. TRIAL LAW. A.J. 49 (1975) (lawyers); Robin & 
Syrnick, Protecting Your Firm Against Liability Cltrims, CIV. ENGINEERING, June 1975, 
at 66 (number of liability claims doubled from 1960 to 1973; dollar amount quadrupled; 
greater than 210 claims per month in U.S.); Zelle & Stanhope, Lawyer Malpractice: The 
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increased to alleged crisis proportions for some professions.1° A 
review of contemporary tort theory and practice as applied to 
the liability of professional persons will help in assessing the sig- 
nificance of these recent developments. 
Although this Article concentrates on the tort liability sys- 
tem, it does not ignore that most injuries and potential claims 
are disposed of outside the formal adjudication system. Many 
injuries are simply borne, and many claims are abandoned. Most 
of the remaining claims are settled and paid by the defendant's 
liability insurer. Even so, tort theory and the adjudicatory pro- 
cess are still relevant, because they provide the formal standards 
by which insurance settlements are made. It is, after all, liability 
insurance that pays most of the settled claims, and liability in- 
surance payments must always take account of potential tort lia- 
bility. Thus, the purpose of this Article is to discuss the tort and 
liability insurance systems as the related regimes under which 
most compensated claims are adjudicated or settled.ll 
Negligence, the predominant tort theory for professional lia- 
bility, is based upon the following elements, which normally 
must be established by the plaintiff: (1) A duty of care imposed 
upon the defendant by law; (2) a breach or violation of the duty 
of care by the defendant; (3) a causal relation between defen- 
Boomerang Principle, TRIAL, June 1977, at 16; Note, Liability of Design Profession- 
&-The Necessity of Fault, 58 Iowa L. REV. 1221 (1973). 
10. Jericho & Coultas, supra note 9, at  833 ("alarming decrease in the number of 
insurance companies willing to underwrite [lawyers'] professional liability insurance"); 
Robin & Syrnick, supra note 9, at 67 (consulting engineers' liability insurance premium 
doubled between 1969 and 1975); 121 CONG. REC. 10505 ("Between 1960 and 1970, mal- 
practice insurance premiums for dentists rose 115 percent; for hospitals, 262 percent; for 
physicians other than surgeons, 540.8 percent; and for surgeons, 949.2 percent."). 
However, there are more recent indications of a countertrend in malpractice liability 
insurance for the legal profession. See NAT. L.J., Feb. 16, 1981, at 1 (number of legal 
malpractice liability insurers increased from 3 to 25 in the last few years; premiums cut 
by as much as ha& causes: improved risk rating methods, competition to get premium 
dollars for investment income at high interest rates, efforts to discourage development of 
bar-sponsored insurance companies). 
11. Tort principles and the judicial process are determinants which must be consid- 
ered in any assessment of this system. Other determinants, such as the cultural, social, 
and psychological forces which contribute to conflict and claims awareness, collateral 
compensation mechanisms, the particular ethics and dynamics of insurance claims settle- 
ment practice, and deficiencies in the delivery of legal services, not directly related to 
tort principles, are also important but beyond the competence of this author and beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
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dant's conduct and plaintiffs injury; and (4) resulting damage to 
some legally compensable interest of the plaintiff." 
The "duty" concept limits defendants' liability to claims 
arising out of particular relationships and risks.lS In professional 
negligence cases, a contract with the client most often creates 
the relationship from which the duty of care arises. However, 
the defendant's tort liability is not based upon breach of cbn- 
tract, but rather upon violation of the legal duty independently 
imposed as a result of what the defendant undertook to do with 
relation to the plaintiffs interests." Thus, when a defendant has 
undertaken to give professional services gratuitously, liability 
may be imposed for injuries resulting from substandard conduct, 
even though there is no contract.l5 
Nevertheless, when professional services are performed pur- 
suant to a contract, the concept of privity of contract has been 
extensively used to shield the defendant from liability for inju- 
ries caused to third persons who were not parties to the con- 
tract.16 An example is the "accepted work" doctrine, under 
which architects and engineers have been insulated from liabil- 
ity to third persons injured by a defective structure after the 
defendant's work has been completed and accepted by the con- 
tracting party." This privity limitation on liability has never set 
12. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 143, 161-66; Epstein, supra note 9, at 96; 
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 59 (1962); Green, Fore- 
seeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); McCoid, The Care Re- 
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 553, 558, 614 (1959); Regalia & 
Johnson, supra note 9, at 50; Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. 
L. REV. 755, 757, 760, 769, 771 (1959). 
13. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 324-27; Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doc- 
trines, supra note 12, at 59-61. 
14. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1049-51 (1956); W. PROSSER, 
supra note 4, at 162; Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 
12 VAND. L. REV. 797-98 (1959); McCoid, supra note 12, at 553-57; Regalia & Johnson, 
supra note 9, at 50; Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REV. 783, 
784 (1959); Wade, supra note 12, at 756-57. 
15. See, e.g., McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209 (1866) (physician); Decatur Land, Loan 
& Abstract Co. v. Rutland, 185 S.W. 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (abstracter); Stephens v. 
White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203, (1796) (attorney); Note, Remedies: Public Defender's Liabil- 
ity to an Indigent Client for Ineffective Representation, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 457 (1977). 
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 622-23; see authorities cited at note 14 supra and 
note 20 infra. 
17. "As yet there has been no case which has ruled the architect or engineer liable 
for a negligently caused physical injury to persons on or off the premises after the struc- 
ture has been turned over to the owner." Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and 
Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1959). More recent authorities indicate that liability 
for physical injuries may extend to noncontracting parties who are forseeably injured. 
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comfortably in the area of physical injuries,18 however, and ex- 
ceptions, which have always occurred, have multiplied and ex- 
panded in recent years to the extent that survival of the privity 
rule may be in doubt? Nevertheless, where physical injury is 
not involved and injury to the third party takes the form of lost 
economic expectations, the privity concept has been an effective 
limitation on liability. Thus, attorneys and accountants have 
generally been liable only to their clients, and third parties who 
have lost money relying upon negligent reports and opinions 
have not been compensated,M except when their reliance was 
quite obviously to be expected for limited purposes that could 
have been anticipateda21 
The role of the duty concept in professional tort liability 
cases is thus an important, but relatively narrow one, which pro- 
tects the professional from liability for injuries caused to persons 
in attenuated nonclient relationships. 
The most important issue in nearly all professional negli- 
gence cases is the defendant's breach or violation of a duty of 
care.22 Again, this concept precludes liability unless the injured 
See Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959) (supervising 
engineer liable to owner's employee injured by falling duct after construction completed); 
Davidson, The Liability of Architects, TRIAL, June 1977, at 20; Note, supra note 9, at  
1223-25. 
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  622-27, 680-82. 
19. Id.; Davidson, note 17 supra. 
20. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (attorney); Goodman v. Ken- 
nedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (attorney); Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accountant not liable to third party 
for negligence; may be liable for fraud); Le Lievre & Dennes v. Gould, 118931 1 Q.B. 491 
(C.A.) (architect's erroneous progress certificate); Bergadano, supra note 9, at 234-39 (ac- 
countants); Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice, 48 N m  DAME LAW. 888,894 (1973); Haw- 
kins, supra note 14, at 812-21 (accountants); Roady, supra note 14, at 784-89 (abstract- 
ers); Wade, supra note 12, at 758-60 (attorney); Comment, New Developments in Legal 
Malpractice, 26 AMER. U.L. REV. 408, 421-29 (1977). 
21. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,364 P.2d 685,15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney 
may be liable to intended beneficiaries of negligently drafted will); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 
Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (notary, improperly acting as an attorney, drew up 
invalid will; liable to intended beneficiary); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 
S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountant liable to third-party lender who relied 
upon erroneous audit, when accountant supplied audit directly to lender at borrower's 
direction); cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public weigher 
employed by seller, liable to buyer to whom erroneous certificate was supplied); Regalia 
& Johnson, supra note 9, at 56-59 (limited instances of lawyers' third-party liability); 
Comment, note 20 supra (lawyers' third-party liability). 
22. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  161-66, Bell, supra note 17, at 716 (architects 
and engineers); Bergadano, supra note 9, at 232 (accountants); Curran, Professional 
Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535, 537-40 (1959); Davidson, 
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person proves that the defendant's conduct was substandard to 
the norms of the defendant's profession. The jurors are not per- 
mitted, as they are in most other negligence cases, to infer from 
their own experience and from the circumstances of the particu- 
lar case what the standard of reasonable care should be. 
The proof of the defendant's negligence or breach of duty 
involves two components: (1) Establishing the standards of the 
profession, and (2) producing evidence of substandard conduct 
by the defendant. The legal standard is easily stated: "[OJne 
who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession 
or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally 
possessed by members of that profession or trade in good stand- 
ing . . . ."I3 That is not necessarily the quantitative average or 
median of the profession, but the minimum competence re- 
quired of those who are recognized as qualified in the 
profe~sion.~~ 
The difficulties in applying this standard are largely 
problems of proof. Because the professions are defined by refer- 
ence to specialized knowledge and skills that are not available to 
lay persons, proof of professional standards must generally come 
from an expert witness who is a member of the profession and 
claims to know its standards. The problems of finding members 
of the profession willing to testify against their own are consid- 
erable, even if there is not a "conspiracy of silence" in the non- 
medical professions. Because the professional standard will 
rarely be set by prescriptive or objective rules with sufticient 
specificity for the particular case, proof will usually come down 
to conflicting expert opinions. That is a source of difficulty. Al- 
though professional persons may not overtly object to the ab- 
stract legal principle that would hold them liable for malpractice 
by reference to their own professional standards, they may re- 
sent bitterly the process in which another member of their pro- 
fession, acting as an expert witness under the tutelage of a 
skilled adversary, presumes to judge the defendant's conduct in 
the particular circumstances, with a jury of laypersons making 
supra note 17, at 22 (architects); Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical 
Liability, 12 VAND. L. REV. 633, 640-46 (1959); Hawkins, supra note 14, at 802-09 (ac- 
countants); McCoid, supra note 12, at 558-75 (medical practitioners); Regalia & Johnson, 
supra note 9, at 50-51; Roady, supra note 14, at 786-90 (abstracters); Zelle & Stanhope, 
supra note 9, at 18. 
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1977). 
24. Id. Comment e; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 163. 
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the ultimate decision between conflicting expert opinions. 
The rule that the professional must be judged by the stan- 
dards of the profession is frequently reinforced by two related 
ideas: (1) The standards must be those of the defendant's partic- 
ular school when there are different schools of thought within 
the profession;" and (2) a professional may not be found negli- 
gent for a mere error in judgment." The former principle is well 
established in medical malpractice cases but has had little ap- 
parent development in claims against the other professions, per- 
haps because different "schools of thought" are not so well de- 
veloped in the other professions. The latter idea is used to 
instruct the jury that a defendant may not be found negligent 
merely because hindsight suggests that he may have made an 
unfortunate decision, when by the standards of the profession it 
was an acceptable choice among other alternatives at  the time. 
However, a professional may be liable for mistakes in judgment 
that fall below the standards of the profe~sion.'~ 
In other kinds of cases, the victim is occasionally relieved of 
the heavy burdens of proving negligence by the use of res ipsa 
loquitur. This rule, when invoked by the court, permits the jury 
to find negligence, without specific proof of substandard con- 
duct, from the mere fact that injury occurred under circum- 
stances that are probably best explained by a commonsense in- 
ference of negligence? By definition, this rule is not generally 
available in professional service cases because the technical cir- 
cumstances in which injury occurs are generally beyond the 
jury's competence to evaluate or draw inferences on the basis of 
common experience.'@ While recent expansion of the use of res 
ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice casesM has been cited as 
25. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  163; McCoid, supra note 12, a t  560-65. This 
rule as to different "schools of thought" should be distinguished from the rule that a 
"specialist" within a profession is to be judged by the higher standards of his speciality 
rather than the general standards of the profession. See McCoid, supra note 12, at 566- 
67. There is some indication that this rule as to specialists may be extended to the legal 
profession. See Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 
1975); Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, supra note 20, at  411-15. 
26. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 162 (medical profession); Haughey, supra note 
20, at 897 (lawyers); Wade, supra note 10, at 764-65 (legal profession). 
27. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clawing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968). 
28. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 211-28. 
29. Id. at 164-65, 226-28. 
30. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 
(1967); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577 
(1964); Epstein, supra note 9, at  138-41; Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical 
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possibly contributing to the liability insurance crisis in the med- 
ical professi~n,~' there is little indication of its extensive or ex- 
panded use in tort claims against the nonmedical  profession^.^^ 
Once the negligence issue is overcome, the issues of causal 
relation and damage remain. In claims against architects and en- 
gineers involving physical injuries, the causal relation issue 
should be a straightforward, factual question of molecular con- 
nections." However, the issue is occasionally burdened with ad- 
ditional complications-under the name of "proximate cause" - 
when forces other than the defendant's conduct have been in- 
strumental in bringing about the injury." The causation issue 
gets into more difficult subjective problems in claims against 
lawyers and accountants when the injury takes the form of lost 
economic expectations. Even if the client proves such loss and 
the defendant's negligence, the case may be lost because of the 
client's inability to prove reliance upon the defendant's mis- 
take? A similar complication in claims against attorneys for liti- 
gation malpractice requires the client to prove the ultimate mer- 
Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. 
REV. 51, 52, 65-73 (1977). 
31. [Rles ipsa loquitur has been an issue in an increasing percentage of appel- 
late decisions in the past 20 years. I t  was considered in 13.4% of the cases 
decided in the period 1961-1971 as compared with only 6.3% of the cases de- 
cided prior to 1950. The commission is concerned that doctrines like res ipsa 
loquitur not be expanded judicially to the point where the liability of health- 
care providers is based solely on circumstantial evidence of negligence. The 
trend in this direction is disturbing and, if not checked, could further aggra- 
vate the existing problems. 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 29. 
32. See Bell, note 17 supra (architects and engineers; no mention of cases decided 
on the basis of res ipsa loquitur); Haughey, supra note 20, at  893 (lawyers; no serious 
assault on rules as to burden of proof); Hawkins, note 14 supra (public accountants; no 
res ipsa loquitur cases); Wade, supra note 12, at 766 ("There is no indication of applica- 
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to attorney-negligence cases."); Zelle & Stan- 
hope, supra note 9, at 18-19 (lawyers' malpractice; some recent expansion); Comment, 
supra note 20, at  429, 432 (suggesting that recent decisions may recognize a few errors, 
such as allowing the statute of limitations to run before filing a claim, as being so obvious 
that specific evidence would not be required to establish negligence). 
33. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 
548-61 (1962). 
34. E.g., Miner, Read, & Garrette v. McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138 (1909). 
35. See Laehn Coal & Wood Co. v. Koehler, 276 Wis. 297, 64 N.W.2d 823 (1954) 
(attorney who purchased property for client without disclosing tax lien was not liable; 
client unable to prove that he would not have ratified the transaction if he had known of 
the tax lien); Mead v. Ball, Baker & Co., 106 L.T.R. (n.8.) 197, 38 T.L.R. 81 (C.A. 1911) 
(investor unable to prove that bad investment had in fact been induced by erroneous 
financial information supplied by accountant); Regalia & Johnson, supra note 9, a t  51-52 
(attorney malpractice). 
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its of the claim or defense which was forfeited due to the 
attorney's negligence," and even to prove that the lost judg- 
ment, if won, would have been c~llectible.~~ 
Proof of damage is always an important issue in any tort 
case, but the issue rarely assumes any peculiar characteristics in 
negligence claims against the  profession^.^^ 
Tort theories other than negligence are rarely used against 
professions. The rigors of negligence theory are occasionally 
avoided in suits against members of the medical profession by 
raising claims of assault and battery for unauthorized medical 
operationsse or by pointing to a lack of "informed consent,"40 
but there is no apparent equivalent for the nonmedical profes- 
sions. It has been persuasively argued that the law of deceit or 
misrepresentation, with its portent of stricter liability, is better 
suited than negligence theory for claims against professional 
suppliers of information in high-level financial t ransa~tions.~~ 
However, such cases are still frequently litigated as negligence 
claims.'% It is theoretically possible to sue architects and engi- 
neers for breach of warranty or to hold them strictly liable in 
tort for injuries caused by defective products, but the corporate 
manufacturer or seller is usually the target defendant in such 
product liability cases, and so far the courts have refused to ex- 
tend such strict liability to the providers of professional 
36. See Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . . A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 
225 (1958); Wade, supra note 12, at  769-70; Zelle & Stanhope, supra note 9, a t  18; Com- 
ment, supra note 20, at 433-35. 
37. See Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918). These are really questions 
of "damage" and not "causal relation." 
38. However, it should be noted, as emphasized several places in the text, that tort 
claims against the nonmedical professions may involve two quite different kinds of dam- 
age: (1) physical harm, and (2) lost economic expectations. 
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  104-05. 
40. For criticism of the misuse of "informed consent" as battery when i t  should be a 
negligence claim, see W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 165-66; Plant, An Analysis of "In- 
formed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968). 
41. Green, The Communicatiue Torts, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1975). Such theories have 
been used against the nonmedical professions. See United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 
F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (architect); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62, 65-66, 
250 N.E.2d 656, 660, 663 (1969) (surveyor); Olitkowski v. St. Casimir's Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 302 Mich. 303, 4 N.W.2d 664 (1942) (attorney); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accountant); Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Per- 
sons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966). 
42. See Maxey v. Quintana, 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1972) (realtor); 
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 446 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountant); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 552 (1977). 
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services.4s 
Consequently, concern with tort liability for the nonmedical 
professions necessarily focuses upon the negligence theory. The 
foregoing discussion shows that the most significant characteris- 
tic of that theory has been its defensive thrust. It serves to pro- 
tect professionals from liability for injury to clients or third per- 
sons in most cases, and permits the imposition of liability only 
when the claimant can overcome the heavy burden of proving 
substandard conduct by reference to the profession's own stan- 
dards. If there is cause for criticism, it is not in the theoretical 
statement of negligence principles, but in the way in which they 
are applied or misapplied in the course of adversary proceedings. 
The traditional tort and liability insurance system has sur- 
vived through an era of dynamic change in technology and social 
and economic relationships because it combines (1) an accept- 
able standard of liability with (2) a credible conflict-resolution 
process, to provide (3) an individualized remedy (4) that is ac- 
cessible on private initiative and (5) has been made workable by 
liability insurance. 
Negligence theory has provided a workable standard of lia- 
bility because it is highly flexible and can adjust to changing 
conditions without revising the law.44 The negligence standard 
changes as professional practices change. The negligence stan- 
dard is also acceptable because it  commands sufficient moral 
support to be enforceable. The professions cannot overtly repu- 
diate a rule that purports to judge them by their own standards. 
On the other hand, the public is not yet adverse to leaving some 
victims uncompensated when the defendant professional has 
done nothing wrong. Importantly, if some of the injuries result- 
ing from professional services are to be compensated while 
others are not, the legal standard that discriminates between 
such losses must have some rational basis that enjoys moral sup- 
port, and it is by this test that the negligence theory should be 
43. ~ e ( e  Note, note 9 supra; but see Davidson, supra note 17, at 23. 
44. See Green, The Regenerative Process in h w ,  33 IND. L.J. 166, 168-70 (1958); 
Hawkins, supra note 14, at 822-23; Henderson, supra note 4, at 408-09, Wade, note 12 
supra. 
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j~dged.'~ If it is judged by reference to an assumption that all 
injuries should be compensated, it will be irrelevant and 
indefensible. 
The traditional tort system has survived this long, in part, 
because it employs a credible conflict resolution process." The 
process is presided over by a prestigious, neutral referee and de- 
cision maker, the judge, in whom we have invested generations 
of tradition and elaborate institutional arrangements to assure 
his impartiality and fairness." By the peculiar genius of the 
common law, his decisionmaking responsibilities are shared by 
the lay public through jury participati~n.'~ The interests of the 
parties are represented by trained advocates who shape the is- 
sues, marshal the evidence, and present the proof in the ways 
they think most relevant to their client's concerns.'@ Although 
the process is intricate, cumbersome, and often expensive, expe- 
rience has proven that the outcome is sufficiently acceptable, 
even to the loser, and has sufficient moral force as to make it 
enforceable at relatively low public cost.'O 
The traditional tort system provides a remedy that is indi- 
vidually fashioned in response to the peculiar circumstances of 
each case. Alternative reparation systems, such as worker's com- 
pensation and automobile no-fault legislation, have invariably 
imposed stricter limitations on the remedy, both as to total 
amount and as to the compensability of particular items." Tort 
damage theory has few arbitrary limitations and, as applied by 
the jury in each individual case, is responsive enough to include 
such items as pain and suffering, indignity, loss of social ameni- 
45. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROB- 
LEM 5-15, 30-32, 58-65, 71-72 (1965); Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second 
Look At First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769, 788 (1980); Henderson, supra note 
4, at 409. 
46. See P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-21 (2d ed. 1977); F. Jlraa~s 
& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 4-8 (2d ed. 1977); Adams, The Small Claims Court and 
the Adversary Process: More Problems of Function and Farm, 51 Cm. B. REV. 583, 592- 
600 (1973); Neef & Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal System from a 
Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123 (1974). 
47. See B. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, supra note 46, at  9-10, 17-18; F. JAMES & G. 
HAZARD, supra note 46, at 5; Adams, supra note 46, at  593-94; Green, The Study and 
Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEx. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1955). 
48. See Green, supra note 47, at  13-15; Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 
YALE L.J. 482, 483-84 (1956). 
49. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 46, at  4-8; Adams, note 46 supra. 
50. See P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, supra note 46, at  1; Adams, supra note 46, at  
594. 
51. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 45, at  36. 
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ties, and impaired family relations, as well as out-of-pocket eco- 
nomic 10sses.~' Although some recent studies have cast doubt 
upon the importance of damages for pain and suffering, in terms 
of public acceptability,"' it is still important that the tort pro- 
cess give injured persons the satisfaction of feeling that their 
dignitary interests have been individually assessed. 
The traditional tort process is one that is accessible by indi- 
vidual initiative to any victim? An injured person has immedi- 
ate access to the powers of government by hiring a lawyer and 
filing a lawsuit. This advantage may be overstated because some 
individuals may have difficulty finding a lawyer who will present 
the caseP Furthermore, court congestion, aggravated by the 
complexities of tort theory and practice, may unconscionably de- 
lay the remedy." But the fact remains that the victim does not 
need the permission of anyone else to assert the claim, nor must 
he wait upon some government agency to investigate or prose- 
cute it. Once an individual has filed a claim, the other side is 
required to respond, and both parties stand as equals before the 
court, no matter how unequal they might be in political, social, 
and economic power outside the courtro~rn.~~ And this all pro- 
ceeds in the open air of public scrutiny." 
Notwithstanding these considerable strengths of the tort- 
adjudication process, it is doubtful that the system could have 
survived this long without assistance from the institution of lia- 
bility insurance." At least in some major areas of accident repa- 
rations, the insurance settlement process carries the burden of 
disposing of most cases; the judicial system would have collapsed 
long ago if individual adjudication had been required for more 
than a small fraction of the increasing claims generated by our 
technological society.6o Liability insurance did not play such a 
52. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 45, at 35-36; Green, supra note 33, at 
574-75; Green, No-Fault: A Perspective, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 82-83; Green, The Duty 
Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 310-11 (1929). 
53. See O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, 
When & Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 29-34. 
54. See Green, No Fault: A Perspective, supra note 52, at 82. 
55. See Adams, supra note 46, at 602-03. 
56. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 29-55 (1975); J. O'CONNELL, THE 
INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 3-7 (1971). 
57. See Green, No Fault: A Perspective, supra note 52, at 82. 
58. Id. 
59. See Henderson, supra note 4, at 410-15, 418. 
60. See A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 3-4, 237-55 (1964) [hereinafter cited A. CONARD]. 
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major role in the disposition of malpractice claims against the 
nonmedical professions until quite recently, but there is little 
doubt about its importance in this area today. 
The observed advantages of the tort and liability insurance 
system must, of course, be weighed against some important dis- 
advantages. From the victim's perspective, the most serious dis- 
advantage is that not all victims are compensated." Only those 
who can afford to invoke the process and who are able to prove 
the defendant's fault will be compensated. Liability and dam- 
ages are very complex issues and thus require large investments 
of time and effort to get compen~ation.~~ Meritorious small 
claims go unprosecuted because of these heavy costs." Payment 
of compensation may be delayed beyond the time when it is 
most needed. Lastly, access to the full advantages of the tradi- 
tional tort system requires the expensive services of a lawyer. 
From the perspective of the liability insurer, the complexi- 
ties and vagaries of the tort adjudication process unduly compli- 
cate the fixing of rates and reserves and make coverage very 
risky and often unprofitable." 
From the perspective of the defendant-professional, liability 
insurance costs may be too high or insurance may be unavail- 
able. Members of the professions have a particular dislike for 
involvement in adversary  proceeding^.^^ They resent having 
their professional skill and judgment questioned in public by 
other professionals acting as expert witnesses and they doubt 
that jurors have the capacity to deal with such technical mat- 
ters. Professionals suspect that the jury is more likely to em- 
pathize with the victim than to understand the difficulties of 
professional practice. They are concerned that their professional 
reputation may be damaged, regardless of the outcome of the 
case, and such injury to reputation is not remedied by liability 
insurance. 
How, then, shall these claimed advantages be weighed 
against the claimed disadvantages in the modern setting of tort 
liability for the nonmedical professions? No objective cost-bene- 
61. See J. O'CONNEU, ENDING INSULT O INJURY 29, 41 (1975). 
62. Id. at 29-30. 
63. Id. at 41. 
64. REPORT, supra note 9, at 41-42; Jericho & Coultas, supra note 9, at 833-35. 
65. See REPORT, supra note 9, at 18-20; Fleming, supra note 22, at 634; Polsky, The 
Malpractice Dilemma: A Cure for Frustration, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 359 (1957); Starr, Mal- 
practice: The Doctor's Discomfort, Blur LEADER, Jan. 1976, at 10. 
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fit study is yet a~ailable:~ and there is disagreement over the 
subjective measures of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the 
traditional system.e7 It might simply be concluded that the bur- 
den of proof has not yet been carried by the proponents of 
change. But first, the present situation of tort liability of the 
nonmedical professions should be compared with other areas of 
tort law where the traditional system has been replaced or sup- 
plemented by an alternative reparation system. The two obvious 
analogies are automobile no-fault statutes and worker's compen- 
sation statutes-alternatives which have developed particularly 
in the tort context as a replacement or supplement for faltering 
adjudicatory processes. 
IV. FAILURES OF THE TRADITIONAL TORT SYSTEM AND 
SUBSTITUTE R PARATION SYSTEMS 
Automobile personal injury no-fault statutes are the most 
recent example of a substitute or supplementary reparation sys- 
tem? It is still unclear whether this phenomenon will expand to 
nationwide coveragee9 or whether it will ever become more than 
a supplementary small claims system.'O Either way, it must be 
66. Compare the extensive empirical studies which provided the data needed for 
automobile no-fault legislation: A. CONARD, note 60 supra; 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTA- 
TION, AUTOMOBILE P RSONAL INJURY CLAIMS (1970); WALTER E. MEYER RESEARCH INSTI- 
TUTE OF LAW, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUTO VICTIMS (1968); Morris & Paul, The Finan- 
cial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U .  PA. L. REV. 913 (1962). 
67. Compare J. O'CONNELL, note 61 supra, with W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, note 45 
supra. 
68. A summary of automobile no-fault legislation is contained in O'Connell, Opera- 
tion of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault.] Other recent discussions of de- 
velopments in automobile no-fault legislation include Epstein, note 45 supra; Henderson, 
No-Fault Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the United States, 
56 OR. L. REV. 287 (1977); Lewis, Latest No-Fault Developments-The New York State 
Insurance Department's Role, 1980 INS. L.J. 267; O'Connell, No-Fault and Political 
Practicalities, 1980 INS. L.J. 82; O'Connell & Beck, An Update of the Surveys on the 
Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws, 1979 INS. L.J. 129. 
69. O'Connell observes that some form of automobile no-fault legislation was en- 
acted in 24 states between 1970 and 1975, but the movement has stalled with no more 
states adopting a no-fault statute since 1975. O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault, note 68 
supra. One of the 24 states, Nevada, repealed its no-fault statute, NEV. REV. STAT. $3 
698.010-.510 (repealed 1980); and "repeated efforts to introduce some automobile no- 
fault plan at  the federal level, be it through direct enactment or by the creation of mini- 
mum standards for state plans," have failed. Epstein, supra note 45, at  770. 
70. Of the 23 states that have no-fault statutes, nine impose no tort liability exemp- 
tion, so that the statutes merely provide first-party insurance benefits as a supplement to 
the tort reparations system. Of the remaining 14 statutes, 13 impose a tort liability ex- 
emption threshold of $2,000 or less in medical expenses, so that the "no-fault" system is 
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viewed as a significant example of legislative dissatisfaction with 
the traditional tort system. Closer examination of this phenome- 
non indicates that many of the reasons for replacing the tradi- 
tional tort liability approach with automobile personal injury 
no-fault statutes do not apply to the liability of nonmedical 
professions. 
In traffic injury cases, the traditional fault concepts of negli- 
gence and contributory negligence were difficult to apply realis- 
tically. With millions of motor vehicles moving at high speeds in 
limited areas, frequent collisions inevitably resulted from many 
causes, including mechanical failures, road conditions, and split 
second driver decisions that are not easily characterized in terms 
of moral fault. The difficulties of recapturing these fast-moving 
events in credible testimony after the event were almost insur- 
mountable. In other words, there was very little assurance that 
the traditional tort system was deciding which victims should be 
compensated on the basis of the fault assumptions upon which 
the rules were based.?l 
Moreover, both the judicial system and the liability insur- 
ance system for settling claims were so overloaded with small 
claims that serious malfunctions resulted. Court congestion and 
the complexity of the fault issues not only caused serious delay 
in payments but resulted in the overpayment of nuisance claims 
and underpayment of serious injuries.12 The public became so 
concerned about the numbers of uncompensated victims that it 
became a political issue.?' Carefully documented empirical stud- 
ies showed an unacceptable cost-benefit ratio in liability insur- 
ance 
Although the fault concept poses some difficulties in profes- 
sional liability claims, they are not the same difficulties encoun- 
tered in the automobile personal injury context. In professional 
malpractice cases, the burden of proving fault is very heavy be- 
the exclusive remedy for only relatively "small claims." See Green, No-Fault: A Perspec- 
tive, supra note 52, a t  84-86; Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault 
Statute, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 383, 385-90. 
71. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 
9-14 (1971). 
72. See id. at 5-7; 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC ONSEQUENCES OF 
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 235 (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHI- 
CLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94-100. (1971). 
73. O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault, supra note 68, a t  26-27. 
74. Cost-benefit data from the various studies is graphically summarized in P. KEE- 
TON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 790-95 (2d ed. 1977). 
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cause of the complexity of the issue and because proof must 
come from the defendant's own profession. However, there is no 
widespread concern, as in the automobile injury cases, that 
events are so fast-moving that evidence on the fault issue has 
very little to do with the actual facts of the case. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs contributory fault, which is almost always an issue 
and frequently a critical issue in most automobile personal in- 
jury cases, plays no important part in most professional mal- 
practice cases? 
No evidence indicates that the judicial system or the insur- 
ance settlement system has become overloaded with small claims 
in professional malpractice. In fact, it appears that the costs of 
prosecuting professional malpractice claims are so high and the 
risks are so great that only the more serious injuries are ac- 
cepted for prosec~tion.~~ At least there does not appear to be 
anything comparable to the nuisance settlement phenomenon 
which occurred in automobile liability insurance practice. Nor 
does any apparent evidence point out that the numbers of un- 
compensated victims from professional services have become so 
large as to create a general social welfare problem.77 Although 
there is evidence of rapidly rising liability insurance costs, even 
for the nonmedical  profession^,?^ the increase has not yet 
spawned the level of public concern that aroused state legisla- 
tures to action in the automobile accident field.?@ 
Perhaps even more important than the above differences are 
the special conditions in the automobile injury setting that facil- 
itated the legislative imposition of a supplementary no-fault rep- 
aration system. It was easy to define the "compensable 
eventw-a physical injury produced by an automobile-without 
reference to the fault of the parties. But the injury resulting 
from professional services among the nonmedical professions 
75. See Hawkins, supra note 14, at 809-12 (accountants); Regalia & Johnson, supra 
note 9, at 53-56 (lawyers). 
76. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 30; REPORT, supra note 9, at 10-11, 18, 32- 
33, and app., at 13, 20-21 (1973); Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in 
Perspective, 1976 INS. L.J. 90,93-94; Carpenter, The Patient's Compensation Board: An 
Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1976 INS. L.J. 81,83; Starr, supra note 65, at 
11. 
77. The problem of uncompensated victims may be approaching the dimensions of a 
serious social welfare problem in the medical malpractice area. See REPORT, note 9 
supra. 
78. See authorities cited at note 10 supra. 
79. See O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault, note 68 supra. 
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may often be described no more precisely than client dissatisfac- 
tion, which is difficult to contemplate as defining the compensa- 
ble event for insurance payments without reference to whether 
the professional services were substandard (i.e., negligent).80 
Most motorists already had some form of automobile acci- 
dent insurance before the no-fault requirements. The no-fault 
legislation required no more than a conversion of this third- 
party liability insurance, in part, to first-party casualty insur- 
ance. Existing requirements for registration and licensing of mo- 
tor vehicles provided a control point for enforcing the first-party 
insurance requirements8' 
By way of contrast, most persons injured by professional 
services do not have insurance covering that particular activity, 
and there is no convenient licensing or regulatory scheme 
through which clients must pass in order to seek professional 
services. Consequently, no-fault insurance coverage for persons 
injured by the nonmedical professions would have to be third- 
party liability insurance, purchased by the professional to cover 
his clients and other potential  victim^.^' This creates an entirely 
different set of conditions because the person injured cannot 
rely upon market incentives to regulate his dealings with the in- 
surer." This suggests that worker's compensation statutes, a 
form of third-party no-fault liability insurance, may provide a 
closer analogy to the professional liability situation than do the 
automobile personal injury no-fault systems, which employ a 
first-party casualty insurance scheme. 
Worker's compensation statutes provide the earliest exam- 
ple of a statutory no-fault reparation system being substituted 
for the traditional tort liability system. However, the reasons for 
dissatisfaction with the tort system as applied to injured em- 
ployees have very little relevance to current concerns about the 
tort liability of professionals. Defensive tort doctrines, which 
were developed during the 19th century to relieve enterprises 
from the burden of compensating their victims, applied with 
particular harshness to defeat the claims of many injured em- 
80. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 72-73; Abraham, Alternatives to the Tort 
System for the Nonmedical Professions: Can They Do the Job?, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 
61-62; Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U .  PA. L. REV. 590, 614-15 
(1973). 
81. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 70-71. 
82. Id. at 89-111. 
83. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 71, at 95-96. 
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pl~yees.~* These defenses of contributory negligence, assumption 
of risk, and negligence of fellow employees, have had very little 
effect upon tort claims based upon professional malpractice. 
Moreover, the incentive for worker's compensation reform came 
principally from widespread public concern for the rehabilita- 
tion of large numbers of uncompensated victims and their de- 
pendents who had become a general social welfare problem.- In 
individual terms, the problems of some uncompensated victims 
of professional malpractice may be just as s e r i o u ~ ~ ~  but again 
little evidence indicates that their numbers have reached the 
proportions of a public welfare problem. 
Because the worker's compensation systems provided for 
third-party insurance-with employers providing insurance cov- 
erage for injured workers-substantial governmental involve- 
ment was required to assure adequate protection of employee 
interests." The statutes also imposed fixed limits on compen- 
satione8 which have been criticized for providing inadequate re- 
lief and for failing to respond to changing economic condition~.~ 
To the extent that these conditions apply in a third-party insur- 
ance no-fault scheme, they must be considered potential 
problems in devising no-fault insurance alternatives for the non- 
medical professions. In that context, such extensive administra- 
tive enforcement and such severe limitations on compensation 
might be unacceptable. 
In the area of employee injuries, the worker's compensation 
remedy has not been exclusive. Third-party tort suits against 
persons other than the employer whose conduct might have con- 
tributed to the employee's injury have provided an important 
84. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  525-34; Green, The Duty Problem in Negli- 
gence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,260-70 (1929); Henderson, supra note 4, at 413-14. 
85. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at  530-31; Henderson, supra note 4, at 413-14. 
86. However, fewer of the injuries caused by the nonmedical professions will be 
physical harms to the person. 
87. See generally A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION F R OCCUPATIONAL IN- 
AND DEATH §§ 78.00, 78.10, 80.00, 80.10, 81.00, 82.60, 92.00, 92.60, 97.00 (Desk ed. 1972); 
W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELA- 
TION 451-70 (1974). 
88. See A. LARSON, supra note 87, at  $9 2.50, 58.00, 58.10; W. MALONE, M. PLANT & 
J. L I ~ E ,  supra note 87, at  46-49, 365, 372-74, 402-05. 
89. See W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITIZE, supra note 87, at  374; Katz & Wirpel, 
Workmen's Compensation 191 0-1 952: Are Present Benefits Adequate?, 4 LA. L.J. 167 
(1953); Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen's Compensation, 
36 MINN. L. REV. 119, 128-30 (1952). 
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and substantial s~pp lemen t .~~  No one has measured the extent 
to which this tort supplement has been necessary to the accep- 
tance of the worker's compensation system.s1 It is not clear who 
would be the unwilling Samaritans to provide supplementary 
tort remedies for the victims of professional services if the liabil- 
ity of the professions were limited to some no-fault insurance 
payment. 
The traditional tort liability system has been replaced or 
supplemented with some form of mandatory insurance providing 
limited compensation on a no-fault basis when the following 
conditions have combined: 
1. An expanding area of activity that produces a high volume 
of disabling bodily injuries to many members of the general 
public; 
2. Inadequate adjustments in tort law or in the management of 
the judicial system; 
3. Resulting stress on the liability insurance system; and 
4. Emergence of a widely perceived social welfare problem as to 
the compensation of victims. 
Conditions regarding persons injured by the nonmedical 
professions have not developed to an extent or in a way compa- 
rable to these conditions that led to worker's compensation and 
automobile injury no-fault compensation statutes. For example: 
1. Even though claims against the nonmedical professions 
have been increasing, most of the claims involve lost economic 
expectations and not disabling bodily injuries.@' 
2. Tort law and the judicial system may not have responded 
adequately to particular difficulties in professional malpractice 
90. See A. LARSON, supra note 87, at 88 71.00, 71.10. 
91. The May 1977 issue of For the Defense, p. 63, reports some interesting figures 
from a recent survey conducted by the Insurance Services Offices. As to insurance claims 
paid in product liability cases, injuries to workers at their places of employment account 
for 55% of bodily injury claims and 64% of the amount paid. This indicates that a major 
function of products liability claims has been to provide a supplementary remedy for 
workers whose claims against their employers were limited to recovery of workmen's 
compensation benefits. 
92. Malpractice by lawyers and accountants almost always produces lost economic 
expectations rather than bodily injury. Malpractice by architects and engineers may re- 
sult in bodily injury, but such claims account for less than 15% of total settlement dol- 
lars, and the bulk of the claims are for property damage and structural remedial costs. 
Robin & Syrnick, supra note 9, at 66. 
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cases, such as the proof of professional standards. However, 
nothing is comparable either to the unholy trinity of defenses 
that made a mockery of most worker's tort claims prior to 
worker's compensation statutes, or to the docket-clogging flood 
of automobile injury claims that provided impetus for no-fault 
statutes for small claims. 
3. Concern is growing over rising costs and the availability 
of liability insurance for the nonmedical professions, but the evi- 
dence is inconclusive as to whether the problem is approaching a 
crisis level.9s 
4. The fourth condition above, which has been a major im- 
petus for previous no-fault movements, is certainly not evident 
as applied to the victims of the nonmedical professions. Dissatis- 
faction with the existing system and calls for change come, not 
from large numbers of uncompensated victims and their political 
representatives, but rather from the professionals and their lia- 
bility insurers who fear excessive liability? This is not to say 
that current dissatisfaction with the tort system as applied to 
the nonmedical professions is unconcerned with consumer inter- 
ests, because the consumers of professional services will surely 
have to pay for rising liability insurance costs. But in terms of 
the impetus for legislative reform, the causes for dissatisfaction 
with the traditional tort system as applied to the nonmedical 
professions come from a different direction with a quite different 
appeal than the social welfare concerns that fueled the worker's 
compensation and automobile no-fault movements. 
Mandatory first-party insurance, which appears to be the 
more efficient no-fault system, is not realistically possible for the 
victims of the nonmedical professions. Mandatory third-party 
no-fault insurance may require more severe limitations on com- 
pensation and a heavier administrative enforcement apparatus 
than the public is prepared to accept. 
Consequently, it appears that the traditional tort~liability 
insurance system will probably continue for some time as the 
basic reparation scheme for persons injured by the nonmedical 
professions. Leon Green put the issues in perspective almost 50 
years ago: 
The process in negligence cases, of all the patterns of the judi- 
cial process, is least fixed and most flexible. Judge, jury, and 
93. See authorities cited at note 10 supra. 
94. See text accompanying notes 9-10, 65-67 supra. 
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formulas which go to make up the process may react differ- 
ently in every case. The process is highly individualistic, highly 
elastic. It  allows the widest latitude for judgment. No aggregate 
of scholars or judges or practitioners can anticipate its judg- 
ment with assurance in a single complex case. Each case is new 
to it and must be subjected to it for a fresh judgment. It  is slow 
and tedious. . . . When society has made up its mind and in- 
sists upon quantity production-something automatic and uni- 
form, something simple and "fool proof '-the high individual- 
ism of the judicial process in negligence cases will prevent its 
meeting these demands. Here the stage of experiment has 
passed and a standardized machinery which gives dependable 
results without exacting too much judgment is required. This is 
the stage for . . . workmen's compensation, . . . commissions 
and other so-called administrative devices.s6 
The tort liability system has not yet reached the point when 
volume requires automation in processing professional liability 
claims, except possibly for medical injury claims. That is not to 
say that the time will never come for the other professions, but 
when it does, distinctive problems among the several professions 
will probably lead to the development of varied alternatives or 
supplements rather than to a comprehensive reparation system 
covering all of the professions. 
Distinctive alternatives should develop in response to the 
difference between bodily injuries and lost economic expecta- 
tions. The former, because of their appeal to social welfare con- 
cerns and the ease of defining the compensable event, are more 
easily accommodated under the basic protection logic of no-fault 
plans, in which limited compensation is paid on the basis of in- 
jury alone. These characteristics, in addition to the more wide- 
spread incidence of medical injury, set medical claims apart 
from the claims against most of the other professions. 
Among the nonmedical professions, only the design and en- 
gineering professions are likely to have claims for bodily injury 
resulting from their professional services. When the volume of 
such claims becomes high enough and liability insurance be- 
comes too costly, they are likely to be swept into whatever alter- 
native reparation scheme has been developed for medical injury 
claims, assimilated under some more comprehensive compensa- 
tion plan for all bodily injuries, covered by a national health in- 
surance plan, or handled by some combination of the above. 
- - -- 
95. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, supra note 52, at 281. 
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However, most malpractice claims against the design and 
engineering professions, and almost all claims against lawyers, 
accountants, and other financial service professions, will involve 
lost economic expectations rather than bodily injury? Such eco- 
nomic losses are not likely to qualify for mandatory no-fault in- 
surance legislation, not only because they lack basic social wel- 
fare appeal, but also because the compensable event may be 
impossible to define without reference to some fault in the quali- 
ty of professional services." On the other hand, the commercial 
setting of many such claims invites bargained alternatives to tort 
liability, such as compulsory arbitration, mediation, presuit 
hearing panels, and elective no-fault insurance. 
The legal profession, because of the conflict of interest aris- 
ing from its exclusive access to and special influence upon the 
judicial system, should assume peculiar responsibilities in pro- 
viding remedies for malpractice claims against its own members. 
It should never be allowed to foreclose jury trial for those ag- 
grieved clients who want the traditional remedy, but it should 
also take the lead in offering easily accessible alternatives, such 
as informal grievance mechanisms, presuit hearing panels, or ar- 
bitration, at the client's option. 
In the meantime, consideration should be given to more im- 
mediate reforms within the existing tort system. There have re- 
cently been considerable ferment and experimentation with pro- 
posed reforms, largely in the medical malpractice context." 
96. See authority cited at note 92 supra. 
97. See authorities cited at note 80 supra. 
98. See Comment, Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 39 
OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1978), which summarizes recent legislative reforms in three categories. 
The first category limits the patient's recovery and includes statutes (1) setting a maxi- 
mum amount recoverable, (2) eliminating punitive damages, (3) abrogating the collateral 
source rule, (4) limiting the use of the ad damnum clause, (5) assuring that payments 
made to plaintiff before trial will not be introduced into evidence in a later trial or con- 
strued as an admission of negligence, (6) providing for installment payments rather than 
lump sum payments of judgments, and (7) curbing excessive contingent fees or requiring 
court approval of attorney's fees. Id. at 856-60. 
The second category modifies substantive law, making the plaintiflPs recovery more 
difficult, and includes legislation affecting (1) the statute of limitations, (2) the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, (3) the doctrine of informed consent, and (4) liability for breach of 
express contracts. Id. at 860-68. 
The third category provides for screening panels or arbitration boards to consider 
medical malpractice claims before they are presented for trial. Id. at 855. Other proposed 
modifications would require special verdicts as to particular damage items, prescribe 
more careful qualifications for expert witnesses, provide for court-appointed witnesses, 
and award attorney's fees as part of court costs in the judgment against the losing party. 
The following are recent court decisions ruling upon these medical malpractice re- 
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Some of these proposals to restrict damages are ill-suited to 
nonmedical cases, where lost economic expectations pre- 
dominate and where pain and suffering and collateral source 
payments are rarely involved. But other proposals for procedural 
reform and tightening statutes of limitations may deserve con- 
sideration as applied to nonmedical professions as well as medi- 
cal malpractice. None of these proposed reforms would change 
drastically the substantive rules under which the defendant's li- 
ability is determined by reference to professional standards. Nor 
would they alter radically the elements of individual adjudica- 
form statutes: Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (provision al- 
lowing evidence of collateral sources valid; screening panels valid, but requirement that 
nonprevailing party post bond before proceeding to trial invalid); American Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Lodp GatasSaratoga, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 
Cal. Rptr. 513 (1980) (provision for periodic payment of damages invalid); Aldana v. 
Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (provision for pretrial medical mediation panel, previ- 
ously upheld as facially valid, now held invalid because arbitrary and capricious as ap- 
plied); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (legislation 
limiting damages may be valid); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 
(1979) (special statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions valid); Wright v. 
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (maximum limit on 
recovery and delegation of judicial functions % review panel invalid); Johnson v. St. Vin- 
cent Hosp., Inc.,-404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) (recovery limitation and panel re- 
quirement provisions of medical malpractice act valid); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med- 
ical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980) (provision abrogating collateral source rule 
valid); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978) (medical review panel require- 
ment and ad damnum clause proscription valid); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 
274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978) (arbitration panel re- 
quirement valid); Cioffi v. Guenther, 374 Mass. 1, 370 N.E.2d 1003 (1977) (shortened 
statute of limitations valid); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 
(1977) (screening panel valid); State ex rel. Cardinal Blennon Memorial Hosp. for Chil- 
dren v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (requirement of pretrial screening panel 
invalid); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (upholds elective 
provisions imposing medical review panel, review of attorney fees, reduction of recovery 
by insurance, and limitation of recovery to maximum of $500,000 to qualify for assured 
judgment fund); Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976) (two-year stat- 
ute of limitations valid); Carson v. Maurer, 49 U.S.L.W. 2502 (N.H. 1980) (statute that 
imposes two-year limitation, limits recovery to $250,000, abolishes collateral source rule, 
and authorizes periodic paymenta violates state equal protection guarantees); Arneson v. 
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (statute imposing ceilings on recovery and modifying 
doctrines of informed consent, res ipsa loquitur, and collateral source rule invalid); Si- 
mon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. 
1976) (dictum--ceiling on recovery invalid); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 
343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio C.P. 1976) (pleading requirements and abrogation of collateral 
benefits rule invalid); M a t h  v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385,421 A.2d 190 (1980) (section of 
malpractice act giving medical arbitration panels exclusive jurisdiction invalid as ap- 
plied); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (provi- 
sion for periodic payments of large awards valid). 
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tion or settlement that have been identified as strengths of the 
traditional torthiability insurance system. 
